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Interim Progress Report

On

DoD Directive 3000.05

*Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*



August 2006

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Washington, D.C.

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“Your charge will be to challenge inherited assumptions and cherished habits, and seek out better approaches. I urge you to make that the bedrock of your career.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
USAFA Commencement, 31 May 2006

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(U) INTRODUCTION

(U) This report provides a six month assessment of efforts in the Department of Defense (DoD) to implement DoD Directive 3000.05 *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* issued in November 2005. It highlights significant initiatives currently underway or planned throughout DoD. It provides policy recommendations for senior leadership to achieve further progress.

(U) Increasing stability operations capabilities across DoD is essential to conducting irregular warfare and major combat operations, winning the Long War, and advancing U.S. national security interests in the 21st century. To address these challenges, DoD Directive 3000.05 directs the Department of Defense to ensure that stability operations are “given priority comparable to combat operations.” In particular, it stresses that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”

(U) The impetus for the Directive was the 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) report, *Transition To and From Hostilities*. The report noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has conducted stability operations every 18-24 months. More importantly, the Defense Science Board revealed that the cost of these operations far outstrips the cost of major combat operations in both blood and treasure. The report concluded that these costs can and should be reduced by improving the ability of the United States government to perform these missions.


(U) WHY BE CONCERNED ABOUT DEVELOPING STABILITY OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES NOW?

(U) The United States must prepare for integrated military and civilian operations to meet irregular and traditional challenges worldwide. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are two fronts in the Long War: much of the effort will be in countries with which we are not at conflict and will require dispersed and protracted operations against an agile, adaptive enemy. Traditional adversaries will attempt to exploit our vulnerabilities by focusing their efforts away from the U.S. military’s competitive advantage in conventional combat.

(U) In this environment, meeting critical national security priorities will often require U.S. forces to conduct military operations in the midst of civilian populations. Success will increasingly depend on maximizing the good will and cooperation of these populations and minimizing the risk of adverse consequences from our actions – such as increased local support for extremists and their violent ideologies. As the Department updates strategic and operational guidance to address these challenges, implementation of

DoD Directive 3000.05 will help ensure the availability of the right capabilities to conduct the inter-related irregular warfare tasks associated with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and stability operations (See Figure 1).

**(U) Figure 1:
Relationship Between Stability Operations and Other Forms of Irregular Warfare**




(U) U.S. operations throughout the 1990s, along with the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that followed, have demonstrated the need to improve the stability operations capabilities of U.S. armed forces. The South Asian earthquake and the East Asian tsunami provided additional lessons for the U.S. military in disaster response and humanitarian interventions.

(U) The skills required for those missions are also vital for success in meeting irregular challenges by which our enemies are likely to confront us. Recent strategic and operational guidance recognizes this:

- (U) The Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establish that U.S. forces need to be as capable in stability operations and irregular warfare as in major combat.
- (U) Three of the five main lines of operation in the Department's Plan for the Global War on Terror (GWOT) are non-kinetic: e.g. deterring tacit and active support for violent extremists (See Figure 2).

(U) **Figure 2:**
Global War On Terror Campaign Framework



(U) Even though our enemies have been driven to emphasize irregular tactics, DoD continues to emphasize the kinetic lines of operations, traditional or irregular, at the expense of the non-kinetic. The results for the U.S. are increased costs and higher risks of failure.


(U) Without successful implementation of the tasks set out in DoD Directive 3000.05, U.S. forces will not be prepared to conduct the non-kinetic lines of operations in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) or future major combat operations effectively. Success in the Long War requires the integration of combat operations to kill or capture enemy forces with military and civilian stability operations focused on civilian populations.

(U) Although these points have been absorbed throughout the Defense Department over the last several years at the conceptual level, the Department and the larger U.S. government still spend inadequate effort on population-centered stability operations designed to create conditions inhospitable to the enemy. Enemy-centered warfare that does not profoundly take into account the need to secure, influence, and support local populations will be insufficient to meet U.S. military and political objectives.

(U) KEYS TO SUCCESS

(U) Many U.S. military commanders are rising to the challenge of integrating combat operations with stability operations as operational experience galvanizes change. In Iraq, Major General Peter Chiarelli was among the first to identify the non-kinetic lines of operation critical to success. His lines of operation are now part of a draft Joint Operating Concept on stability operations (see Figure 3). The skills required to succeed in Baghdad – to lead and effectively support stability operations tasks – will be critical for a diverse set of future missions: shaping activities, irregular warfare, humanitarian missions, and traditional operations.

(U) Figure 3:
Major General Peter Chiarelli's Stability Lines of Operations



(U) While the lines of operation in Figure 3 comprise both civilian and military activities, common sense and DoD Directive 3000.05 dictate that “U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all (lines of operation) when civilians cannot do so.” The current lack of civilian capacity to deploy in sufficient numbers and the perennial inability of civilians to operate in insecure environments means that DoD will often be asked to take on stability operations tasks.

(U) Vastly inadequate capacity in the U.S. government outside of the Defense Department will remain a problem in the conduct of effective stability operations in dangerous environments. Promoting increased deployable civilian capacity must remain a top DoD priority, but the process will take years, if not decades, and require revolutionary Congressional action with respect to budgets and authorities. Hardly any new deployable civilian capacity in other departments and agencies has been created in the last several years despite Presidential requests, National Security Presidential Directives, and Defense Department urging.

(U) For the Department to conduct and support the stability component of operations effectively, its civilian and military leaders need to continue to drive the changes the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary launched in the Directive. That especially means:


- (U) Emphasize the importance of stability operations tasks in virtually all critical DoD missions.
- (U) Mitigate the negative effects of predictable gaps in civilian capacity by preparing U.S. military forces for likely stability operations tasks.

Hardly any new deployable civilian capacity in other departments and agencies has been created in the last several years despite Presidential requests, National Security Presidential Directives, and Defense Department urging.

(U) A NEW DIMENSION OF TRANSFORMATION

(U) Military operations most often require a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. As Figure 4 reveals, the stability operations components of major missions have generally carried the highest costs, in part because they generally last much longer.

(U) Figure 4: Costs of Military Operations



From 1990 to April 2006, stability operations imposed far greater costs on the United States than major combat operations.¹ Even excluding Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, the supplemental costs of stability operations in the 1990s were nearly four times those of combat operations.

(U) Enhancing DoD stability operations capabilities will reduce the heavy toll of such operations by making the U.S. military better at them and, hence, shortening those engagements. Success requires expanding defense transformation to include stability operations-oriented

“Transformation is first and foremost about changing culture. Culture is about behavior—about people – their attitudes, their values and their beliefs. What we believe, what we value, and our attitudes about the future are ultimately reflected in our actions – in our strategies and processes, and the decisions that emerge from them.”

*-- Admiral Arthur Cebrowski,
Director of Office of Force Transformation*

¹ (U) Sources for Casualty Data: Washington Headquarters Services Directorate for Information Operations & Reports - Statistical Information Analysis Division: <http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmids/casualty/castop.htm>

(U) Sources for Cost Data: DSB 2004 Summer Study, DoD Comptroller, Congressional Research Service, and Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

(U) Major Combat Operations Include: Desert Storm/Desert Shield; Bosnia (pre -Dayton Accord Nov '95); Kosovo air war and Operation Noble Anvil; Operation Enduring Freedom (Oct '01- Dec '01), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Mar '03 - Apr '03).

(U) Stability Operations Include: Operation Restore Hope (Somalia); Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti); Bosnia (post-Dayton); Kosovo (post-air war); Operation Enduring Freedom (Jan '02 - Jan '06); Operation Iraqi Freedom (May '03 - Jan '06).

changes to our knowledge-bases, processes, and skills. The essence of this transformation dimension is about changing mindsets and habits that no longer meet DoD requirements. It does not require expensive technology, new weapons acquisition, or massive re-organization.

(U) Changes in institutional culture do not occur overnight. Although there is evidence that changes in institutional culture are developing from the bottom up as our armed forces conduct stability operations around the globe, shaping and supporting this shift is also one of the responsibilities of senior leadership.

(U) Even where Defense Department personnel understand the need for change, bureaucratic processes and institutional inertia often stymie their efforts. The challenge for senior leadership is to help overcome ingrained habits, reward personal initiative and effective processes, sustain organizational learning, and communicate a vision for change. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary provided the necessary framework in DoD Directive 3000.05 for leaders to advance this defense transformation.

(U) DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation is not taking place in a vacuum. Through the 2006 QDR, DoD senior leadership identified a diverse set of issues requiring action. Stability operations are addressed in depth in the Irregular Warfare (IW) Roadmap, but also will rely on efforts undertaken in the Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), Strategic Communications, and Authorities Roadmaps.² The Deputy's Advisory Working Group

² (U) The IW Roadmap is the most explicit in relating to DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation. Many of the skills and capabilities required for IW are necessarily the same for stability operations. The IW Roadmap contributes to Directive implementation by emphasizing, among other things:

- Building partner capacity for IW;
- Supporting educational and long-term training opportunities for officers, including planners;
- Supporting greater opportunities for officers to develop language skills and cultural knowledge;
- Cross-walking the stability operations country list with the IW country list; and
- Fostering civil society and good governance in ungoverned areas.

(U) The BPC Roadmap highlights the need to build partner stability operations and IW capacity. Partner capacity extends not only to foreign military and security forces, but also to increasing the capacity of other USG agencies (e.g., State/USAID) to deploy civilians to the field, whether in support of U.S. military forces or by themselves. Objective 4.4.2 in the roadmap addresses initiatives for building partner stability operations capacity, including:

- Institutionalizing stability operations in NATO planning, doctrine and education;
- Evaluating the Global Peace Operations Initiative and determining how to improve African Union capabilities; and
- A plan of action to improve the UN's peacekeeping mission management and oversight through reform of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

(U) The Authorities Roadmap provides senior leadership a means to track all the legislative initiatives identified through the QDR process, including the authorities identified.

(U) The Strategic Communications Roadmap recognizes the crucial importance of understanding variegated audiences of U.S. policy and the emphasis on maintaining credibility and trust. Strategic communications must support U.S. goals in stability operations and IW. Absent an effective, integrated, coordinated strategic communications program, our efforts will come to naught. This roadmap will work to address this problem.

(DAWG) and its underlying staffing mechanisms ensures that issues of importance to multiple constituencies, such as funding for new capabilities, are addressed and integrated across these inter-related efforts.

(U) To boost these efforts and ensure success in DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation, this report highlights many low-cost, high-yield initiatives in areas such as planning processes, readiness assessments, doctrine, education, training, and information sharing. With senior leadership endorsement and modest resources, these actionable initiatives will lay the path toward realizing the Department's goal of giving stability operations comparable priority to combat operations.

The challenge for senior leadership is to help overcome ingrained habits, reward personal initiative and effective processes, sustain organizational learning, and communicate a vision for change.

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary provided the necessary framework in DoD Directive 3000.05 for leaders to advance this defense transformation.

*“Only leadership can blast through the many sources of bureaucratic inertia...
Only leadership can get change to stick, by anchoring
it in the very culture of the organization.”¹*

-- Honorable Pete Aldridge, former USD (AT&L)


(U) KEY FINDINGS

(U) The sections below present findings and recommendations important to meeting the general challenge of institutionalizing stability operations across DoD. They are presented within three major groups:

- (U) I. *Internal*: Efforts to improve DoD stability operations performance.
- (U) II. *Interagency*: DoD support for U.S. government stability operations capabilities development and integration.
- (U) III. *External*: DoD support for security cooperation, shaping, and coalition stability operations.

(U) The following findings and recommendations are derived from extensive coordination and inputs from DoD components in response to implementation efforts since November 2005 (See Figure 5).

Figure 5: DoD Directive 3000.05 Implementation Timeline



(U) **I. Internal: Efforts to Improve DoD Stability Operations Performance**

(U) DoD components have made great progress in meeting the exigencies of ongoing stability operations and the challenges identified in DoD Directive 3000.05. This progress however, has been uneven, ad hoc, and incomplete. Continued support from senior leaders throughout DoD is required to drive and institutionalize the changes recommended in this report.

(U) Positive efforts stand out in such areas as doctrine, training, education, and experimentation. But even in these areas, work remains to embed better approaches into broader Defense Department processes of change and adaptation.

(U) Shortcomings are conspicuous in such areas as overall stability operations capacity, planning, intelligence, and information sharing – despite best efforts by various pioneering and innovative individuals. Overall capacity is a particularly important concern. Although overall capacity is inadequate, the magnitude of the deficiency is uncertain. Clarifying the scope of this capacity gap will be a priority focus of the next phase of the DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation process.

(U) *Doctrine and Concepts:*

(U) The critical step in integrating stability operations across DoD is to establish a consistent intellectual foundation in formal doctrine. There are many documents that seek to classify “stability operations” and “stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations”³. While these documents have similar themes, they are not always consistent. This has caused confusion among DoD components and is a roadblock to implementing DoD Directive 3000.05.

(U) Incorporating stability operations into official joint doctrine will help solve many of these problems. So far, progress has been good. Key draft Joint Publications reflect close integration of stability operations across the spectrum of conflict.⁴ They are consistent with the intent of the Directive and will help to shift the mindset that places combat and stability operations into different mental boxes.

(U) *Current Challenge:* A plethora of competing definitions for “stability operations” and “stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations” have emerged

³(U) See for instance: DoD Directive 3000.05, the Joint Operating Concept for “Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” and the Joint Capability Area for “Stability Operations: Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.”

⁴ See for instance: Draft Joint Publication 3-0 *Operations* and Joint Publication 5-0 *Planning*.

in the absence of approved joint doctrine for stability operations causing confusion among DoD components and impeding implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05

(U) **Next Steps:** *Joint Publication 3-0 Operations is in its final round of staffing. Once approved, it will become the primary document for defining and describing stability operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to ensure that other stability and SSTR operations documents (e.g., Joint Capability Areas) are consistent with JP 3-0.*

(U) Training:

(U) Stability operations training has significantly adapted in recent years. Individual and collective training courses, home station training, and mission readiness exercises have added emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, cultural awareness, and interaction with local populations. The principal combat training centers have boldly transformed to address stability and counterinsurgency experiences from the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, in addition to preparing for future challenges that may arise. These changes must be institutionalized while balancing against the need to continue training for traditional combat operations.

(U) *Current Challenge:* The Department needs to identify measures of effectiveness that will help establish an appropriate balance between better training for stability operations and maintaining high-caliber training for traditional combat operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) and the CJCS are conducting a report expected late-September 2006 on the institutionalization of stability operations into training and exercises. The report will address the incorporation of stability operations activities into: mission essential task lists; universal joint task list; defense readiness reporting system; training institutions; and exercises.*

(U) Education:

(U) Stability operations topics are being included throughout the professional military education (PME) system and stability operations has been listed as a “Special Area of Emphasis” for Joint PME. However, to achieve comprehensive organizational culture change, stability operations considerations must be integrated into basic thought processes for a majority of military tasks. This can be affected by including stability operations in the baseline curricula at every level of the education system. Thematic inclusion across curricula is more important than the addition of electives.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Preliminary inquiry suggests the degree to which stability operations are incorporated into DoD education programs varies by institution and is not well coordinated.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will continue to seek funding for a Stability Operations/Irregular Warfare Hub (as called for in DoD Directive 3000.05 and the QDR Irregular Warfare Roadmap) to help coordinate educational activities.*

(U) *Intelligence:*

(U) Stability operations depend on the military's ability to operate effectively in a foreign society. Therefore, one of the most important intelligence objectives is to ensure that operators in the field have knowledge of host populations: social structure (ethnic groups, tribes, elite networks, institutions, organizations and the relationships between them), culture (roles/statuses, social norms and sanctions, beliefs, values, and belief systems), cultural forms (myths, narratives, rituals, symbols), and power and authority relationships. This information must be appropriately linked to geospatial coordinates and provide a basic map of the human terrain that will improve the operational effectiveness of U.S. forces.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Our intelligence community is not organized to provide operationally-relevant socio-cultural knowledge to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Additionally, it is unclear whether the Combatant Commands are able to fulfill their mandate to develop intelligence campaign plans in support of stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to ensure that Combatant Commands are able to accurately define intelligence requirements for stability operations and that U.S. military forces have access to the full range of information they need to conduct stability operations.*

(U) *Guidance and Scenarios for Force Sizing and Shaping:*

(U) The Strategic Planning Guidance specifically directs DoD components to size and shape forces to "conduct a large-scale, long-duration irregular warfare campaign." This guidance plus current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provide both the strategic direction and experience needed to develop realistic Defense Planning Scenarios that address stability operations capabilities and capacity.

(U) While the Defense Planning Scenarios for the most recent Strategic Planning Guidance have not yet been developed, there is at least one existing Defense Planning Scenario that could be used for stability operations force sizing and shaping: This scenario addresses stability operations and irregular warfare issues; however, DoD

components should be aware that the information on interagency capacity is incomplete. They should adjust their approaches accordingly. The new set of Defense Planning Scenarios will include many more irregular scenarios and more accurate information on interagency capacity.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Defense Planning Scenarios for the most recent Strategic Planning Guidance have yet to be developed and the old Defense Planning Scenarios are of limited utility for stability operations force sizing and shaping because they provide poor information on interagency capacity.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will develop a new set of Defense Planning Scenarios based on the most recent Strategic Planning Guidance that includes better information on interagency capacity, and can be used for force sizing and shaping for irregular warfare and stability operations.*

(U) Planning:

(U) Military planning should integrate stability operations activities into all phases of planning and in all portions of plans. This will require close coordination with interagency partners to ensure a “whole of government” approach, synchronize operational objectives with strategic and political goals, and develop realistic assumptions about interagency capacity. To date, there have been only modest changes to existing war plans and the war planning process. DoD planners do not have a consistently clear understanding of stability operations requirements. Interagency participation is minimal and occurs late in the planning process. The 2007 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) will be revised to incorporate detailed planning guidance for stability operations-oriented tasks – including end-state objectives, assumptions, planning factors, and common planning requirements for Combatant Commanders.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Interagency partners are not included in DoD planning in a meaningful way, nor is there any Secretary of Defense approved plan to do so. Any plan to include interagency partners should be done on a Secretary of Defense-approved basis that allows him to carry out his legal responsibilities and ensure mission effectiveness.

(U) **Next steps:** *USD(P) will work with CJCS to develop a plan for Secretary of Defense approval to incorporate interagency partners into DoD planning (as required by the BPC Roadmap). One option is to “test” interagency participation in and use the lessons-learned to develop criteria for integrating stability operations into all CONPLANs.*

(U) Information Sharing:

(U) Connecting the information and communications systems of the diverse governmental and non-governmental actors participating in stability operation is critical to success. Much work is underway to find technological solutions to existing problems; however, even if technology overcomes the gap between systems, we will continue to face serious problems concerning the release and sharing of information among DoD, other U.S. Government organizations, international partners, and NGOs.

(U) Existing policies and regulations and the institutional tendency to over-classify information impede effective information exchange between the military and partners on the ground. Also, current law does not give DoD the flexibility to provide and, most importantly, leave behind critical communications and information technologies. DoD must develop, along with the Director of National Intelligence, mechanisms to allow for rapid sharing of critical information with other U.S. departments and agencies, international partners, and NGOs. As restrictions on this type of activity are generally policy-based, senior DoD leadership direction is necessary to improve our information sharing capabilities.

(U) *Current challenge:* Policy, processes, and legislation still hamper efforts to adequately share information with the many non-DoD partners operating in stability operations environments. While the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)) has made progress in overcoming some of the technological obstacles to information sharing, other players need to support this forward movement by working to lessen the procedural and policy barriers.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with USD(I) and ASD(NII) to overcome the policy and legislative obstacles to effective information sharing. This may include forming a working group or task force.*

(U) Lessons Learned:

(U) The capacity for armed forces to learn contemporaneously is especially critical for a force that will operate in different cultural landscapes, among civilians and against adaptive, thinking enemies around the world.

“In the volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment we face for the foreseeable future, if we were to choose merely one advantage over our adversaries it would certainly be this: *to be superior in the art of learning and adaptation.*”

- MG David Fastabend,

(U) Enabling leaders to adapt to these unpredictable circumstances requires that institutional systems, structures, and processes are in place that can capture new knowledge from the field and quickly disseminate it throughout the organization and across agencies. Although parts of the U.S. military already possess remarkable skill in generating and disseminating lessons learned, similar efforts across DoD are inconsistent and reflect cultural and resource differentials among services. Moreover, stability operations present unique challenges to existing tactically-focused military lessons learned processes. Best practices for tasks associated with economic development, governance, and reconstruction, are harder to identify without longer-term observation of second-order effects.

(U) *Current Challenges:* Current lessons learned processes, which are focused on capturing tactical-level knowledge for rapid dissemination, do not adequately capture strategic and more complex lessons in stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will investigate ways to improve these processes and make recommendations in the next SecDef Report.*

(U) Advocates and Resources:

(U) The combination of DoD Directive 3000.05, the QDR Roadmaps for Irregular Warfare, Building Partnership Capacity, Authorities, and Strategic Communication, and other related efforts have created a welter of activity in the Pentagon. While this is necessary and welcome, the current momentum will be lost if it is not spread through the rest of the Department.

(U) This is particularly true for implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05. The office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Geographic Combatant Commands, and the Services have all designated key positions as stability operations advocates as required by the Directive.⁵ The advocates' primary role is to create a network of people across the Department who can act as agents of change to incorporate stability operations into DoD's organizational culture. To do this, the stability operations advocates need to be high-level, properly resourced, and have the ability to act as integrators both within their organization and across the Department.

(U) A related issue is the ability of Combatant Commands to accomplish tasks specified in the Directive. Combatant Commanders are the "customers" of this process and should be the ones to determine future stability operations requirements through the planning process. However, the ability of Combatant Commands to determine requirements beyond the near-term is limited, especially when compared with the Services. The Services respond to the Combatant Commanders near-term "demand signals," but are still the *de facto* lead for determining future requirements because they are better resourced. Shifting resources from the Services to Combatant Commands will require high-level support and guidance.

(U) *Current Challenges:* OSD and Joint Staff advocates have only a handful of staff dedicated to leading DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation and have leveraged other parts of OSD and the Joint Staff as much as possible. Combatant Commands have

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OSD & Joint Staff: Stability Operations Advocates		
Organization	Name	Title
OSD(Policy)	Dr. Jeb Nadaner	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Stability Operations)
Joint Staff (J-5)	Col Scott Norwood	Deputy Director (Global Strategic Partnerships)
Geographic Combatant Commands: Joint Force Coordinating Authorities for Stability Operations		
Organization	Name	Title
CENTCOM	RADM Robert Moeller	Director J-5
EUCOM	Brig Gen William Mayville	Deputy Director J-3
PACOM	Brig Gen Kisner	Deputy Director J-5
	BGen Lefebvre	Deputy Director J-3
SOUTHCOM	BG Salvatore Cambria	Deputy Director J-3
Military Departments and SOCOM: Senior Military Officer for Stability Operations		
Organization	Name	Title
Army	LTG Lovelace	Deputy Chief of Staff (G-3/5/7)
Air Force	Lt Gen Chandler	Deputy Chief of Staff (A3/5)
Navy	VAMD John Morgan	Deputy CNO (Information, Plans and Strategy)
Marine Corps	LtGen Mattis	Deputy Commandant for Combat Development
SOCOM	MG D.J. Scott	Deputy Director (Center for Special Operations)

similar difficulties, which may affect their ability to determine stability operations requirements, which is critical to DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with the CJCS and the Combatant Commands to ensure that stability operations advocates are properly resourced and able to fulfill DoD Directive 3000.05 responsibilities.*

(U) Private Sector:

(U) As suggested by the 2005 Defense Science Board study, *Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD*, the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) undertook a study on how to better leverage the private sector for stability operations. USD(AT&L) is currently reviewing the results of the study in coordination with other DoD components. The study recommends creating a new institution to tap private sector expertise more rapidly and integrate that expertise in planning for stability operations. Efforts to improve information-sharing will also be critical to these efforts.

(U) *Current challenge:* The Department lacks an effective mechanism to leverage the private sector for stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(AT&L) is reviewing the results of a study on designing a new institution to leverage the private sector in consultation with other DoD components. USD(AT&L) in coordination with USD(P) will present its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in the next few months.*

(U) Personnel and Skills:

(U) DoD has made numerous changes in personnel policies to adapt to the exigencies of ongoing stability operations. These include the “Rebalancing the Forces” initiative, cross-training career fields such as artillery to civil affairs, and increasing recruitment of linguists, civil affairs, military police, and other high demand career fields.

(U) *Current challenge:* The Department does not track and catalogue skill sets related to stability operations when they are not required for the individual primary position.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with USD(P&R) and others to improve tracking of stability operations skill sets and support legislative action to give DoD authority to track civilian stability operations skills and training even when not required for their primary position.*

(U) II. Interagency: DoD Support for U.S. Government Stability Operations Integration

(U) DoD's coordination with non-military actors has improved dramatically in the past decade. As a result of lessons learned in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, doctrine and concepts have been refined with greater attention paid to working with non-DoD participants during stability operations.

(U) DoD recognizes that future challenges will require a whole of government approach and has actively sought to include interagency participation in its planning, training, exercises, and operations. In addition to having different institutional approaches for preparing for operations, which complicates interagency coordination and planning, non-military agencies lack capacity to surge resources to support military operations.

(U) The establishment of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the subsequent signing of National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) were both positive steps to increasing interagency integration, but few resources have been allocated to S/CRS and little action has been taken to implement NSPD-44. DoD continues to support efforts within the executive and legislative branches to provide resources to its non-military partners.

(U) Planning and Preparing for Operations:

(U) All U.S. Departments and Agencies plan and prepare for operations. The difference between DoD and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is that DoD plans and prepares for *current* and *future* operations and other U.S. Departments and Agencies plan and prepare for *current* operations. This is reflected in the different planning processes across the U.S. Government and the relative spending on training, education, and exercises. DoD spends much more money on training, education, and exercises than other U.S. Departments and Agencies. As a result, personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are only able to attend a small fraction of the training events and exercises to which DoD invites them.

(U) *Interagency Participation in Military Operations:*

(U) Over the past few years, DoD has repeatedly requested additional personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies to support military operations abroad. While the outcome of any particular request is contingent on many factors, there are two general limitations to participation by other U.S. Departments and Agencies in military operations:

- (U) Civilian personnel are not well-suited to operate in a combat environment, and;
- (U) U.S. Departments and Agencies generally do not have “extra” personnel and funding that they can use to surge for military operations.

(U) While the first limitation cannot be overcome, it is possible to develop surge capacity in other U.S. Departments and Agencies with additional resources. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) already has some surge capability in the form of small (i.e., squad or platoon-sized) deployable teams and small amounts (i.e., under \$200 million) of flexible funding. The limiting factor is finding additional resources. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization requested \$25 million in FY07 to develop a civilian reserve capability, which the House of Representatives rejected. USAID also has a proposal to develop “surge” capabilities; however, they planned to rely on DoD funding through Section 1207, which is not a sustainable option⁶.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Despite DoD urging and support, the lack of capacity in other U.S. Departments and Agencies remains the primary challenge in integrating DoD activities with interagency partners. Changing this fundamental dynamic will require persuading a resistant Congress to dedicate additional resources to other U.S. Departments and Agencies for participation in stability operations alongside or instead of U.S. military forces.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will continue to work with other U.S. Departments and Agencies and Congress to help build civilian capacity for stability operations using the QDR Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap and National Security Presidential Directive-44 as guides.*

⁶ (U) Section 1207 is a DoD authority that will expire at the end of September 2007. It is an authority, not an appropriation. Any funds would have to come out of existing DoD accounts and require significant trade-offs.

(U) **III. External: DoD Support for Pre-Conflict Shaping and Coalition Stability Operations Capacity**

(U) The 2006 QDR reinforced the findings of the National Defense Strategy. Both documents stressed the growth of irregular challenges and the need to develop new tools to meet them. The U.S. and its partners will prosecute the Long War in many theaters where conventional combat is not the norm. Our tools to support international partners to help meet these challenges are inadequate. These include:

(U) *Building Partnership Capacity and Security Cooperation (Section 1206):*

(U) Beyond where we are currently engaged in military operations, our enemies most often operate from states that are at peace with us and in fragile states and ungoverned areas. The U.S. has the finest military force in the world, but in many cases, because of particular cultural, social, or political considerations, partner countries are often better positioned to address a threat. Traditional U.S. security assistance is not well suited to build partnership security capacity for emerging requirements.

2006 Building Partnership Capacity

QDR Roadmap:

“Whenever advisable, the United States must work with or through others: enabling allied and partner capabilities, building their capacity and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, risks and responsibilities of today’s complex challenges.

...During the Cold War the legal authorities for military action, intelligence, foreign military assistance and cooperation with foreign police and security services were separately defined and segregated from each other. Today, there is a need for US forces to transition rapidly between these types of authorities in an agile and flexible manner, to meet the challenges of the 21st century.”

(U) The State Department has the lead for the major security assistance accounts, but is under-funded and hamstrung by significant Congressional earmarks (e.g., only 6% of the Foreign Military Financing budget – about \$400 million out of \$4.5 billion – is not earmarked). DoD often implements security assistance, but has little influence on the process and limited authority to conduct capacity building directly.

(U) DoD received a limited, but important new authority in Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act. The authority allows the U.S. to train and equip foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or enable them to

participate in stability operations where U.S. forces are present. The \$200 million per year authorization must be drawn from funds in the Defense-wide Operations & Maintenance account. The authority is set to expire at the end of fiscal year 2007.

(U) The President should have the authority to direct whichever Department or Agency is best suited to address a particular need. The Administration has requested a broadening of the authority to include security forces, increase funding to \$750 million per year, eliminate the “sunset” clause and allow DoD to draw from a broader set of accounts. OSD Legislative Affairs is working on getting congressional approval of the Administration’s proposal.

(U) Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP):

(U) CERP has proven to be a key tool in addressing near-term stabilization, reconstruction, and humanitarian requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military needs a global CERP so it can meet urgent local needs and positively assist and influence the populace. OSD Policy and Legislative Affairs continue to push for this authority.

(U) DoD requested an expansion of CERP authority to global use and an increase in the program cap to \$400 million. Congress has not agreed to either change yet.

(U) Defense Coalition Support Account (DCSA):

(U) Numerous countries have contributed forces to the Long War, but their timely deployment is hampered by equipment needs and long-lead items not readily available (e.g., body armor, night vision devices). DoD sometimes is in the unsustainable position of having to decide between equipping U.S. forces or foreign forces, rather than stockpiling key equipment. Ensuring this equipment is available is key to reducing stress on U.S. forces and quickly deploying partners.

(U) DoD has proposed a revision to law to allow partners to pre-purchase critical equipment. The authority would allow DoD to loan or sell such equipment to partners participating in counterterrorism, stability operations, border security or peacekeeping. Neither the House nor the Senate included this authority in the FY2007 Defense Authorization mark-up.

(U) Logistic Support of Allied Forces:

(U) Even when partners are willing and able to contribute to operations, they are hampered in their inability to deploy quickly and support themselves in the field. Few countries have the lift capabilities to deploy to a theater of operations and provide sustained logistical support over long distances.

(U) DoD is seeking an expanded authority to provide logistic support to allied forces beyond those participating in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress thus far has agreed to an expansion of the authority, to remove the sunset clause, to allow for global use, and to increase the funding limit to \$100 million per year; however, final approval is still in doubt.

(U) *Current Challenge:* Achieving legislative success on the initiatives described above.

(U) **Next Steps:** USD(P) will continue to work with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)) and senior leaders to engage Congress on these critical initiatives.

(U) SUMMARY OF CHALLENGES AND NEXT STEPS

(U) The challenges and next steps presented in this report are the first steps in a longer process for institutionalizing stability operations capabilities and capacity across DoD. The next phase of DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation will include the next steps described below as well as a review of the process by the DoD Directive 3000.05 Steering Committee and the Working Group and prioritization of implementation initiatives and issues areas for the next report to the Secretary of Defense.

Doctrine and Concepts:

(U) *Current Challenge:* A plethora of competing definitions for “stability operations” and “stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations” have emerged in the absence of approved joint doctrine for stability operations causing confusion among DoD components and impeding implementation of DoD Directive 3000.05

(U) **Next Steps:** *Joint Publication 3-0 Operations is in its final round of staffing. Once approved, it will become the primary document for defining and describing stability operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) will work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to ensure that other stability and SSTR operations documents (e.g., Joint Capability Areas) are consistent with JP 3-0.*

Training:

(U) *Current Challenge:* The Department needs to identify measures of effectiveness that will help establish an appropriate balance between better training for stability operations and maintaining high-caliber training for traditional combat operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *The Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) and the CJCS are conducting a report expected late-September 2006 on the institutionalization of stability operations into training and exercises. The report will address the incorporation of stability operations activities into: mission essential task lists; universal joint task list; defense readiness reporting system; training institutions; and exercises.*

Education:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Preliminary inquiry suggests the degree to which stability operations are incorporated into DoD education programs varies by institution and is not well coordinated.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will continue to seek funding for a Stability Operations/Irregular Warfare Hub (as called for in DoD Directive 3000.05 and the QDR Irregular Warfare Roadmap) to help coordinate educational activities.*

Intelligence:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Our intelligence community is not organized to provide operationally-relevant socio-cultural knowledge to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Additionally, it is unclear whether the Combatant Commands are able to fulfill their mandate to develop intelligence campaign plans in support of stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) to ensure that Combatant Commands are able to accurately define intelligence requirements for stability operations and that U.S. military forces have access to the full range of information they need to conduct stability operations.*

Guidance and Scenarios for Force Sizing and Shaping:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Defense Planning Scenarios for the most recent Strategic Planning Guidance have yet to be developed and the old Defense Planning Scenarios are of limited utility for stability operations force sizing and shaping because they provide poor information on interagency capacity.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will develop new set of Defense Planning Scenarios based on the most recent Strategic Planning Guidance that include better information on interagency capacity, and can be used for force sizing and shaping for irregular warfare and stability operations.*

Planning:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Interagency partners are not included in DoD planning in a meaningful way, nor is there any Secretary of Defense approved plan to do so. Any plan to include interagency partners should be done on a Secretary of Defense-approved basis that allows him to carry out his legal responsibilities and ensure mission effectiveness.

(U) **Next steps:** *USD(P) will work with CJCS to develop a plan for Secretary of Defense approval to incorporate interagency partners into DoD planning (as required by the BPC Roadmap). One option is to “test” interagency participation in and use the lessons-learned to develop criteria for integrating stability operations into all CONPLANs.*

Information Sharing:

(U) *Current challenge:* Policy, processes, and legislation still hamper efforts to adequately share information with the many non-DoD partners operating in stability operations environments. While ASD(NII) has made progress in overcoming some of the technological obstacles to information sharing, other players need to support this forward movement by working to lessen the procedural and policy barriers.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with USD(I) and ASD(NII) to overcome the policy and legislative obstacles to effective information sharing. This may include forming a working group or task force.*

Lessons Learned:

(U) *Current Challenges:* Current lessons learned processes, which are focused on capturing tactical-level knowledge for rapid dissemination, do not adequately capture strategic and more complex lessons in stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will investigate ways to improve these processes and make recommendations in next the report to the Secretary of Defense.*

Advocates and Resources:

(U) *Current Challenges:* OSD and Joint Staff advocates to have only a handful of staff dedicated leading DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation and have leveraged other parts of OSD and the Joint Staff as much as possible. Combatant Commands have similar difficulties, which may affect their ability to determine stability operations requirements, which is critical to DoD Directive 3000.05 implementation.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with the CJCS and the Combatant Commands to ensure that stability operations advocates are properly resourced and able to fulfill DoD Directive 3000.05 responsibilities.*

Private Sector:

(U) *Current challenge:* The Department lacks an effective mechanism to leverage the private sector for stability operations.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(AT&L) is reviewing the results of a study on designing a new institution to leverage the private sector in consultation with other DoD components. USD(AT&L) in coordination with USD(P) will present its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in the next few months.*

Personnel and Skills:

(U) *Current challenge:* The Department does not track and catalogue skills sets related to stability operations when they are not required for the individuals primary position.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will work with USD(P&R) and others to improve tracking of stability operations skill sets and support legislative action to give DoD authority to track civilian stability operations skills and training even when not required for their primary position.*

DoD Support for Interagency Capacity:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Despite DoD urging and support, the lack of capacity in other U.S. Departments and Agencies remains the primary challenge in integrating DoD activities with interagency partners. Changing this fundamental dynamic will require persuading a resistant Congress to dedicate additional resources to other U.S. Departments and Agencies for participation in stability operations alongside or instead of U.S. military forces.

(U) **Next Steps:** *USD(P) will continue to work with other U.S. Departments and Agencies and Congress to help build civilian capacity for stability operations using the QDR Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap and National Security Presidential Directive-44 as guides.*

DoD Support for Pre-Conflict Shaping and Coalition Capacity:

(U) *Current Challenge:* Achieving legislative success on the following initiatives:

- Building Partnership Capacity and Security Cooperation (Section 1206)
- Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
- Defense Coalition Support Account (DSCA)
- Logistics Support of Allied Forces

(U) **Next Steps:** USD(P) will continue to work with Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)) and senior leaders to engage Congress on these critical initiatives.